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I. INTRODUCTION
This article surveys significant developments in intellectual property
(IP) law that are likely to be influential in the evolution of Texas IP juris-
prudence. Thus, the cases cited focus on the decisions of the U.S. Su-
preme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. For
developments in trademark and copyright law, although the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s authority is binding, other circuits are con-
sidered highly persuasive.
The U.S. Supreme Court decided several cases involving IP issues dur-
ing this 2019 Survey period. In patents, the Supreme Court considered
the ability of federal agencies to initiate post-issuance challenges to
granted patents,1 and whether the statutory amendments of the America
Invents Act nullified previous precedent relating to the on-sale bar of 35
U.S.C. § 102.2 The Supreme Court also held that the “American Rule”
preventing defendants from recovering attorney’s fees in a successful de-
fense applies to agencies of the federal government.3 The Federal Circuit
weighed in on whether state sovereign immunity can shield a state univer-
sity from post-issuance challenges of its patents under AIA,4 and whether
the Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) of the Patent Trials and Appeals
Board (PTAB) are constitutionally appointed under the Appointments
Clause.5
In copyright, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the time at which a
claimant may file suit,6 and which costs are included in the “full costs”
that may be awarded under 17 U.S.C. § 505.7 In trademark, the U.S. Su-
preme Court considered the constitutionality of the Lanham Act’s ban on
“immoral or scandalous” trademarks,8 and whether a debtor in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding may terminate a trademark license agreement.9 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed whether adding
“.com” to an otherwise generic term can be protectable under federal
trademark laws.10
1. Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1859 (2019).
2. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628, 629 (2019).
3. Peter v. NantKwest, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 365, 371 (2019).
4. Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
5. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
6. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 886
(2019).
7. Rimini St., Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 873, 875 (2019).
8. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019).
9. Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology LLC, 5139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019).
10. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office v. Booking.com, 915 F.3d 171, 184 (4th Cir. 2019).
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In trade secret law, the U.S. Supreme Court provided clarification on
the definition of “confidential” under the Freedom of Information Act.11
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined whether
monitoring an employee’s social media pages results in “unclean hands”
to bar trade secret misappropriate claims.12 Finally, the Texas Legislature
amended its anti-SLAPP statute to prevent its use in trade secret misap-
propriation suits.13
II. PATENT UPDATE
A. THE SUPREME COURT ON PATENTS
1. Petition Undeliverable – Return Mail Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service
The U.S. Supreme Court dealt a blow to the federal government in a
6–3 decision that will prohibit federal agencies from petitioning the Pat-
ent Trials and Appeals Board of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office for post-grant review of patents.14
The United States Postal Service (USPS) considered whether, and ulti-
mately declined, to license a patent owned by Return Mail Inc., which
claimed a method for processing undeliverable mail. The USPS later
launched its own service for processing undeliverable mail, which Return
Mail asserted infringed its patent. A patent infringement suit was filed by
Return Mail in the Court of Federal Claims. In response to the infringe-
ment suit, USPS petitioned the Patent Trials and Appeals Board (PTAB)
for “Covered Business Method” (CBM) review, which is one of three
post-grant proceedings introduced by the 2011 Leahy-Smith America In-
vents Act (AIA).15
The PTAB found the asserted claims of Return Mail’s patent to consti-
tute ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and canceled the
claims.16 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.17
Although Return Mail did not raise the issue, the Federal Circuit stated
in its decision that the federal government is a “person” eligible to peti-
tion for CBM review.18
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit, explaining
that an agency of the federal government cannot be treated as a “person”
within the meaning of the AIA’s post-grant review statutes.19 The Court
noted that there is a “longstanding interpretive presumption that ‘person’
11. Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2366 (2019).
12. Scherer Design Grp. v. Ahead Eng’g, 764 F. App’x 147, 147–48 (3d Cir. 2019) (2–1
decision).
13. Act of June 2, 2019, 86th Leg., H.B. 2730 (amending TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE
ANN. § 27.001 et seq.).
14. Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1858 (2019).
15. Id. at 1361; Leahy-Smith Am. Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 18, 125 Stat. 284,
329 (2011) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 321 (2020)).
16. Return Mail, 139 S. Ct. at 1861.
17. Id.
18. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Return Mail, Inc. 868 F.3d 1350, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
19. Return Mail, 139 S. Ct. at 1859.
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does not include the sovereign,”20 although the term typically does in-
clude “corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, socie-
ties, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”21 The presumption
that the sovereign is not a person “may be disregarded only upon some
affirmative showing of statutory intent to the contrary.”22
USPS argued that the presumption of excluding the government from
statutory uses of the word “person” is rebutted by (1) the “text and con-
text” of the patent laws; (2) “the long history of [government] participa-
tion in the patent system”; and (3) the fact that the government is subject
to liability for infringement.23 The Supreme Court disagreed on all three
points. First, the Court highlighted and contrasted the various uses of the
word “person” in the patent statutes.24 Some uses expressly include the
government,25 some uses expressly exclude the government,26 and some
uses are ambiguous.27 According to the Court, there is no clear rule in the
statute that would indicate whether Congress intended the government to
be able to participate in post-grant proceedings.28 Thus, the Court rea-
soned, the text and context of the patent laws cannot rebut the
presumption.29
Second, the Court noted that although the government has long partici-
pated in the acquisition and assertion of patents,30 that is not relevant to
participation in post-grant review of patents by a federal agency.31
Rather, the Court explained that the post-grant proceedings created by
the AIA have only existed for eight years.32 USPS noted, however, that
the federal government has been able to initiate ex parte reexamination
of another’s patent since 1981. But the Court responded that ex parte
reexamination is a “fundamentally different process” from the more ad-
versarial and adjudicatory post-grant review procedures created by the
AIA.33
Third, the Court was not persuaded by USPS’s contention that because
federal agencies are also subject to liability for infringement, it would be
“anomalous to deny [them] a benefit afforded to other infringers.”34 The
Court dismissed this claim of unfairness, pointing out that the federal
20. Id. at 1861–62 (quoting Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens,
529 U.S. 765, 780–81 (2000)).
21. Id. at 1861–62 (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2019)).
22. Id. at 1862 (quoting Stevens, 529 U.S. at 781).
23. Id. at 1863.
24. Id. at 1863–65.
25. Id. at 1863 n.3.
26. Id. at 1863 n.4.
27. Id. at 1863.
28. Id. at 1865.
29. Id.
30. See Act of Mar. 3, 1883, Ch. 143, 22 Stat. 625.
31. Return Mail, 1309 S. Ct. at 1865.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1865–66.
34. Id. at 1866.
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government may still challenge an asserted patent in federal court.35 Fur-
ther, the Court recalled other statutory provisions that limit a patent
owner’s options for recourse against the federal government.36 Finally,
the Court pointed out that their holding “avoids the awkward situation
that might result from forcing a civilian patent owner (such as Return
Mail) to defend the patentability of her invention in an adversarial, adju-
dicatory proceeding initiated by one federal agency (such as the Postal
Service) and overseen by a different federal agency (the Patent
Office).”37
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan dissented, explaining that al-
lowing the federal government to participate in some aspects of the pat-
ent system but excluding them from others is incongruous.38 The
dissenting Justices point out that the patent laws only seem to exclude the
government from participation in administrative matters or where includ-
ing the government would be completely illogical.39 By contrast, the dis-
sent explains that the government has long been able to participate in the
substantive aspects of the patent system.40
2. Business as Usual for Secret Sales – Helsinn Healthcare SA v. Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA Inc.
Justice Thomas, penning for a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court, pro-
vided some long-needed clarity on the effect of the AIA’s revisions to
previous precedent by holding that the AIA’s amendments to Section 102
will not change the Court’s treatment of confidential sales with respect to
the on-sale bar of Section 102.41
Of the many changes brought with the AIA, one modification is a re-
write of 35 U.S.C. § 102, which defines the scope of prior art references
and events that can prevent patentability of an invention. The relevant
portion recited, before the enactment of the AIA, “[a] person shall be
entitled to a patent unless . . . the invention was . . . in public use or on
sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of application
. . . .”42 The so-called “on-sale bar” of pre-AIA Section 102 was inter-
preted by the Court to include private sales that were not known to the
public.43 When the AIA was enacted, the corresponding language of the
statute was modified to state “[a] person shall be entitled to a patent un-
less . . . the claimed invention was . . . in public use, on sale, or otherwise
available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed in-
35. Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2019).
36. Return Mail, 139 S. Ct. at 1867; 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2019); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)
(2019).
37. Return Mail, 139 S. Ct. at 1867.
38. See id. at 1868–72 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 1869–70.
40. Id. at 1871.
41. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019).
42. Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2010) (emphasis added) (amended 2011).
43. Helsinn, 139 S. Ct. at 630 (citing Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998)).
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vention.”44 Here, the Court was called upon to decide whether this modi-
fication nullified the Court’s previous precedent that secret sales can
trigger the on-sale bar of Section 102.45
Helsinn Healthcare S.A. (Helsinn) developed Palonosetron, a drug
that treats nausea and vomiting caused by chemotherapy. Helsinn en-
tered into a supply and purchase agreement with MGI Pharma Inc.
(MGI) to supply as many 0.25 mg and 0.75 mg doses of Palonosetron as
MGI required. Although the partnership with MGI was publicly an-
nounced, the details of the sale—including the doses that MGI would be
distributing—were not publicly known. Two years after entering into the
purchase agreement, Helsinn filed a patent application covering the 0.25
mg dose of Palonosetron. U.S. Patent No. 8,598,219 (‘219 patent) was
eventually issued, covering the “0.25 mg dose of palonosetron in a 5 ml
solution.”46
Teva Pharmaceuticals sought FDA approval to market a generic ver-
sion of Palonosetron, to which Helsinn responded by filing suit against
Teva for infringing the ‘219 patent. In defense, Teva challenged the valid-
ity of the ‘219 patent on the grounds that the subject matter of the ‘219
patent was “on sale” more than one year before the filing date of the
application, triggering the on-sale bar of Section 102.47 But Helsinn ar-
gued that the on-sale bar was not triggered, since the AIA’s changes to
the statute nullified the Court’s previous precedent regarding secret sales.
The district court ruled in favor of Helsinn, finding that the AIA version
of Section 102 was not triggered by Helsinn’s confidential sale.48 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, and Helsinn appealed
to the Supreme Court.49
The Supreme Court sided with Teva, finding that the AIA did not obvi-
ate the Court’s previous treatment of the on-sale bar of Section 102.50
The Court reasoned there is a presumption that, when the same or similar
language is used in a later version of a statute, the constructions applied
to the earlier version of the statute remain in place.51 The Court also
reasoned that the relatively modest change in “adding the phrase ‘or oth-
erwise available to the public’ to the statute ‘would be a fairly oblique
way of attempting to overturn’ that ‘settled body of law.’”52 The Court
declined Helsinn’s invitation to apply the “associated-words canon,” ex-
plaining that the catchall phrase “or otherwise available to the public” is
not a modifier for the expressly listed categories of Section 102.53 Rather,
the phrase is meant to “capture[ ] material that does not fit neatly into
44. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2011) (emphasis added).
45. Helsinn, 139 S. Ct. at 630.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 632.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 633–34 (citing Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16 (1948)).
52. Id. at 634 (quoting amicus United States at Oral Hearing (Tr. of Oral Arg. 28.)).
53. Id.
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the statute’s enumerated categories but is nevertheless meant to be cov-
ered.”54 Thus, the Court held that previous precedent with respect to the
on-sale bar applies to Section 102(a) as amended by the AIA.55
3. USPTO Gets the American Rule – Peter v. NantKwest, Inc.
In Peter v. NantKwest, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court held that the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) cannot recover attorney’s fees
under Section 145 of the Patent Act.56 Under the Patent Act, an applicant
can challenge a decision of the USPTO by appealing to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (under Section 141) or by suing the
USPTO Director in the United States District Court for the Easter Dis-
trict of Virginia (under Section 145). If the applicant chooses to file a new
civil suit, Section 145 requires that party to pay the legal expenses of the
USPTO.
After the USPTO denied its patent application, NantKwest, Inc.
(NantKwest) filed a civil action under Section 145. After the district court
and the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial, the USPTO moved for
NantKwest to pay for its expenses, including the pro rata salaries of its
legal staff that worked on the case. The district court held that recovery
of pro rata legal fees did clearly overcome the “American Rule,” the pre-
sumption that holds each party accountable for its own legal expenses
regardless of outcome.57 The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that “the
term ‘expenses’ in § 145 ‘specific[ally]’ and ‘explicit[ly]’ authorized an
award of fees.”58 However, the en banc Federal Circuit reheard the case
and reversed the prior decision, holding that the American Rule did ap-
ply to Section 145 “because it is ‘the starting point whenever a party seeks
to shift fees from one side to the other in adversarial litigation.’”59
Before the Supreme Court, the United States argued that the Ameri-
can Rule presumption does not apply to Section 145 because the section
requires the patent applicant to pay the expense of the USPTO regardless
of outcome.60 Thus, the government argued, the statute avoids the Amer-
ican Rule, which only applies when a statute awards fees to a “prevailing
party.”61 The Court disagreed, stating that “the presumption against fee
shifting applies to all statutes—even those like § 145 that do not explicitly
award attorney’s fees to ‘prevailing parties.’”62 Thus, “[t]he American
Rule provides the starting point for assessing whether § 145 authorizes
payment for the PTO’s legal fees.”63 The Court held that the word “ex-
penses” in the Patent Act “does not invoke attorney’s fees with the kind
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Peter v. NantKwest, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 365, 369 (2019).




61. Id. at 371.
62. Id. (citing Sebelius v Cloer, 569 U.S. 369 (2013)).
63. Id.
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of ‘clarity we have required to deviate from the American Rule.’”64 Thus,
the Supreme Court found that the USPTO “cannot recover the pro rata
salaries of its legal personnel under § 145” of the Patent Act.65
B. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ON PATENTS
1. Nice Try – Regents of the University of Minnesota v. LSI Corp.
In 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit turned down
an attempt to protect patents from post-grant challenges based on Tribal
Immunity.66 In Regents of the University of Minnesota v. LSI Corp., the
Federal Circuit similarly held that state sovereign immunity cannot pro-
tect a state’s patents from inter partes review (IPR) challenges.67
The University of Minnesota obtained several patents covering tele-
communications technologies. These patents were later asserted by the
University of Minnesota against LSI and customers of Ericsson, Inc. in
federal district courts. In response to the infringement suits, LSI and
Ericsson separately petitioned the PTAB for IPRs of the asserted patents.
Respective panels of the PTAB held the asserted claims to be invalid.68
The University of Minnesota appealed each PTAB decision to the Fed-
eral Circuit, arguing that because the University is immune from such
litigation as an arm of the state, the IPR challenges could not be brought
against it. The Federal Circuit consolidated the appeals based on the issue
common to each case.69
As explained by the Federal Circuit, states typically enjoy immunity
from suits by private parties.70 The University of Minnesota argued that
because IPRs are initiated by private parties, they are essentially private
disputes between a third party and the patent owner, and therefore the
state should not be subject to post-grant challenges of its patents by third
parties. The Federal Circuit disagreed, recalling its previous decision in
St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, which held that Tribal Immunity did not apply to
IPR proceedings because IPRs amount to agency reconsideration of a
patent, and are not simply disputes between parties about private rights.71
The Federal Circuit highlighted important differences in the character of
post-grant proceedings from district court litigation.72 In particular, the
court noted that the PTAB can proceed forward to a final decision even if
one or both parties decides to cease participating, whereas in federal dis-
trict court litigation there must be a case or controversy for the case to
64. Id. at 372 (citing Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164
(2015)).
65. Id. at 374.
66. See generally St. Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed.
Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019).
67. Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp. 926 F.3d 1327, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1337 (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999)).
71. Id. (citing St. Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir.
2018)).
72. Id. at 1339–40.
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proceed.73 The Federal Circuit also highlighted that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure do not govern post-grant proceedings and that patent
owners “may amend [their] claims” during an IPR, which is unlike district
court litigation.74
The Federal Circuit also rebutted the University of Minnesota’s argu-
ment that the differences between tribal immunity and state sovereign
immunity merit a different outcome from St. Regis Mohawk Tribe.75 The
court explained that, while there are clear differences in the foundation
and effect of each type of immunity, those differences are not relevant to
the question posed in St. Regis Mohawk Tribe and in the present case.76
Rather, in both cases, the reason the immunities do not apply is a matter
of the character of IPRs as agency action rather than private legal
disputes.77
Judges Dyk, Wallach, and Hughes of the Federal Circuit submitted a
concurrence, explaining an additional reason that state sovereign immu-
nity does not apply to IPR proceedings.78 As similarly stated in concur-
ring opinions by the PTAB panels of the IPR decisions below,79 the
concurring judges explained that IPRs are more similar to in rem pro-
ceedings in which the courts exercise jurisdiction over property, and not
the parties disputing the property.80 Thus, explains the concurrence,
states cannot assert sovereign immunity as a shield against IPRs.81
The Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari.82
2. Halloween Scare – Arthrex v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.
In a blood-chilling decision on Halloween, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit held that the Administrative Patent Judges (APJs)
appointed by the Director of the USPTO (Director) to adjudicate post-
grant proceedings were appointed in violation to the Constitution.83
However, the Federal Circuit limited the impact of its holding by severing
the portion of the statute that restricted removal of the APJs in order to
be treated as “inferior officers.”84
Smith & Nephew, Inc. and Arthrocare filed IPR petitions to challenge
Arthrex’s a patent relating to “a knotless suture securing assembly.”85 A
final written decision from a board of APJs found several claims of Ar-
73. Id. at 1339.
74. Id. at 1340.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1341.
78. Id. at 1342 (Dyk, J. concurring).
79. Id. at 1330–31.
80. Id. at 1342–46 (Dyk, J. concurring).
81. Id. at 1346.
82. Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., No. 19–337, 2020 WL 129563 (U.S. Jan. 13,
2020) (denying certiorari).
83. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc. 941 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
84. Id. at 1332.
85. Id. at 1325.
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threx’s patent “unpatentable as anticipated.”86 Although they did not
raise the issue before the board, Arthrex appealed the decision on the
grounds that the appointments of the APJs of the PTAB panels were in
violation of the Appointments Clause of Article II of the Constitution.
The Appointments Clause requires that “superior officers” be ap-
pointed by the President of the United States, while “inferior Officers”
may be appointed by “the Courts of Law, or [ ] the Heads of Depart-
ments.”87 While there is no definitive test for distinguishing superior and
inferior officers, the Federal Circuit evaluated several factors related to
the oversight and responsibilities of the APJs of the PTAB, including
their subjection to review, supervision, and removal.88
Regarding the reviewability of PTAB actions, the Federal Circuit
found that the lack of intra-agency review procedures makes the APJs
look like superior officers.89 Although participants in a post-grant pro-
ceeding may request a re-hearing, PTAB actions are only appealable to
the Federal Circuit.90 The lack of reviewability weighs in favor of treating
APJs as principal officers.91
By contrast, the Federal Circuit found that APJs are subject to substan-
tial supervision by the Director, which is a characteristic of inferior of-
ficers.92 In particular, the Federal Circuit noted that the Director can
issue policy directives, provide instructions including exemplary fact pat-
terns, and designate PTAB decisions as precedential or non-preceden-
tial.93 Further, the Director has authority to create regulations governing
the conduct of post-grant proceedings, designate which APJs sit on a
panel of a given post-grant proceeding, and even set their pay, among
other powers.94
Finally, the Federal Circuit considered whether the Director has suffi-
cient power to remove an APJ, which would suggest the status of an “in-
ferior officer.”95 The court held that although the Director has the power
to assign, and possibly to remove, APJs from individual post-grant pro-
ceedings, the restrictions on removal weigh in favor of treating APJs as
principal officers.96 Specifically, the court noted that the Director may
only remove an APJ in accordance with Title 5, which poses several re-
quirements and limitations on officer removal, including a “nexus be-
tween [ ] misconduct and the work of the agency,”97 written notice of the
86. Id. at 1326.
87. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
88. Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1328–29.
89. Id. at 1331.
90. Id. at 1329.
91. Id. at 1331.
92. Id. at 1332.
93. Id. at 1331.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1332–34.
96. Id. at 1332–33.
97. Id. at 1333 (citing Brown v. Dept. of the Navy, 229 F.3d 1356, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(explaining requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (2019))).
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removal that provides evidence and an opportunity to answer,98 and a
right to appeal the decision to remove.99
Based on these factors, the Federal Circuit held that APJs are principal
officers, given “[t]he lack of any presidentially-appointed officer who can
review, vacate, or correct decisions by the APJs,” in addition to the lim-
ited power to remove them.100 However, the court mitigated the effects
of its decision based on the principle of severability.101 According to this
principle, severing a problematic part of a statute “is appropriate if the
remainder of the statute is ‘(1) constitutionally valid, (2) capable of func-
tioning independently, and (3) consistent with Congress’ basic objectives
in enacting the statute.’”102 Here, the court severed the portion of the
patent statute that applied Title 5’s removal restrictions to the APJs.103
Severing these restrictions gives the Director sufficient removal power
over the APJs to afford them treatment as inferior officers.104 However,
since the panel of APJs that decided the petition above was still subject to
Title 5’s removal restrictions, and thus constitutionally invalid, the Fed-
eral Circuit held that a new panel must be designated and a new hearing
granted.105
The effects of Arthrex extended widely beyond this case. Judge Dyk
lamented that the Arthrex decision required “potentially hundreds of new
proceedings” to be initiated.106 The Federal Circuit declined the parties’
petition for en banc review.107
III. TRADEMARK UPDATE
A. EXPLICITLY APPROVED – IANCU V. BRUNETTI
In Iancu v. Brunetti, the U.S. Supreme Court cleared the way for the
registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks, holding that the
Lanham Act’s bar on such marks violated the First Amendment.108 After
the USPTO denied Erik Brunetti’s application for the trademark
“FUCT” on the basis of the Lanham Act’s prohibition on immoral or
scandalous trademarks, Brunetti appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, arguing that the prohibition violated his First
Amendment rights. The Federal Circuit held that the ban was unconstitu-
98. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b)).
99. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d)).
100. Id. at 1335.
101. Id. at 1335–40.
102. Id. at 1335 (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258–59 (2005)).
103. Id. at 1338 (severing “Officers and Employees of the Office” from 35 U.S.C.
§ 3(c)).
104. Id. at 1338.
105. Id. at 1338–40.
106. Bedgear, LLC v. Fredman Bros. Furniture Co., 783 F. App’x 1029, 1030 (Fed. Cir.
2019) (Dyk, J., concurring).
107. See generally Order Denying Petition for En Banc Rehearing, Anthrex, 941 F.3d
1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (No. 18–2140).
108. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019).
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tional, and the USPTO appealed to the Supreme Court.109
The Court likened Brunetti’s claims to those heard in the recent Matal
v. Tam decision in which “the Court [held] unconstitutional the Lanham
Act’s bar on registering marks that ‘disparage’ any ‘person[ ], living or
dead.’”110 Like the Act’s disparagement bar, the Court held that the “im-
moral or scandalous” ban discriminates on the basis of viewpoint by dis-
tinguishing between “those [ideas] aligned with conventional moral
standards and those hostile to them.”111 For example, the USPTO has
denied the registration of marks like “YOU CAN’T SPELL HEALTH-
CARE WITHOUT THC, MARIJUANA COLA, KO KANE,” and
“BONG HITS 4 JESUS,” while approving marks like “D.A.R.E. TO
RESIST DRUGS AND VIOLENCE” and “SAY NO TO DRUGS—RE-
ALITY IS THE BEST TRIP IN LIFE.”112 Thus, because the ban dis-
criminates on the basis of viewpoint, favoring some ideas over others, the
Supreme Court held that the Lanham Act’s bar on “immoral or scandal-
ous” trademarks violates the First Amendment.113
B. THE DEBTOR’S DILEMMA – MISSION PRODUCT HOLDINGS, INC.
V. TEMPNOLOGY, LLC
In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court settled a circuit split concerning
whether a debtor’s rejection of a trademark license under Section 365 of
the Bankruptcy Code “deprives the licensee of its rights to use the trade-
mark.”114 The Supreme Court held that while a debtor-licensor’s rejec-
tion of a trademark license results in a pre-petition breach, it does not
constitute a rescission of the contract, and thus the licensee may retain
the rights granted to it under the license.115
The Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor filing for Chapter 11 protection
to “reject any executory contract” subject to court approval, but “if the
rejected contract is one ‘under which the debtor is a licensor of a right to
intellectual property,’ the licensee may elect to ‘retain its rights . . . to
such intellectual property.’”116 However, the relevant statutory definition
of “intellectual property” does not include trademarks, leading to a long-
standing question regarding the effect of a debtor-licensor’s rejection of a
trademark license.117
Here, Tempnology granted a non-exclusive license to Mission Product
Holdings to use its trademarks. Several years later, Tempnology filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy and rejected the license agreement.118 Though
109. Id. at 2298.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2300.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2302.
114. Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1657 (2019).
115. Id. at 1657–58.
116. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(a), (n)(1) (2005).
117. Id. § 101(35A).
118. Mission Prod. Holdings, 139 S. Ct. at 1657.
2020] Intellectual Property Law 207
both parties agreed that the rejection allowed Tempnology to stop per-
forming under the contract and entitled Mission to a pre-petition claim
for damages, Tempnology asserted that the rejection also terminated Mis-
sion’s rights to use the licensed marks.
Tempnology obtained a declaratory judgment from the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Court for the District of New Hampshire confirming that its rejec-
tion of the license agreement terminated Mission’s rights. Thereafter, the
U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the First Circuit reversed, holding
that rejection does not eliminate the licensee’s contractual rights, just as
the breach of an agreement outside of bankruptcy does not extinguish the
rights of the non-breaching party.119 Tempnology appealed, and the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit overturned the Bankruptcy Appel-
late Panel’s decision. The First Circuit concluded that allowing the licen-
see to use the mark post-rejection would frustrate the statute’s intent to
“release the debtor’s estate from burdensome obligations” because trade-
mark licensors must exercise quality control over goods bearing the li-
censed marks in order to maintain their trademark rights.120
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “[r]ejection of a contract—
any contract—in bankruptcy operates not as a rescission but as a
breach.”121 While “[t]he debtor can stop performing its remaining obliga-
tions under the agreement . . . the debtor cannot rescind the license al-
ready conveyed.”122
C. THE DOT COM CONUNDRUM – BOOKING.COM V. USPTO
In Booking.com v. USPTO, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that the term BOOKING.COM was descriptive, rather than
generic, and thus was eligible for trademark protection.123
Booking.com, the well-known website for booking travel accommoda-
tions, filed four applications for the trademark BOOKING.COM, which
sought protection for the mark in connection with online hotel reserva-
tion services. The USPTO denied registration of the BOOKING.COM
marks, stating that BOOKING.COM was a generic term for hotel reser-
vation services. The USPTO also held that, if not generic, the marks were
at least merely descriptive and that Booking.com did not prove that
BOOKING.COM had acquired secondary meaning, a requisite showing
for marks that are considered “merely descriptive.”124 Booking.com ap-
pealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), which af-
firmed the refusals on the same grounds as the trademark examining
119. Id. at 1659.
120. Id. at 1660 (quoting Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC (In re
Tempnology, LLC), 879 F.3d 389, 402 (5th Cir. 2018)).
121. Id. at 1661.
122. Id. at 1662.
123. Booking.com B.V. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 915 F.3d 171, 179 (4th Cir.
2019).
124. Id. at 177–78.
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attorney.125 Next, Booking.com appealed in a civil action in the Eastern
District of Virginia, arguing that BOOKING.COM was eligible for trade-
mark protection because it was not a generic term, but rather was sugges-
tive—or at least descriptive—of hotel reservation services.126 The district
court agreed, finding that, while “booking” was a generic term for the
services, BOOKING.COM was descriptive and Booking.com’s consumer
survey127 proved that the marks had acquired secondary meaning. The
district court ordered the USPTO to register two of the BOOK-
ING.COM marks and ordered Booking.com to pay the USPTO’s ex-
penses, including the salaries of the legal personnel who worked on the
case.128 Both parties appealed, the USPTO challenging the descriptive-
ness holding and Booking.com challenging the order to pay the USPTO’s
attorney’s fees.
The Fourth Circuit held that BOOKING.COM was not generic and
was indeed a protectable trademark.129 First, the court found that the
burden of proving genericness falls on the USPTO.130 In determining
whether the mark was generic, the court relied on a three-step analysis:
(1) identify the class of product or service to which use of the mark is
relevant; (2) identify the relevant consuming public; and (3) deter-
mine whether the primary significance of the mark to the relevant
public is as an indication of the nature of the class of the product or
services to which the mark relates, which suggests that it is generic,
or an indication of the source or brand, which suggests that it is not
generic.131
As both parties agreed that (1) BOOKING.COM identifies hotel reser-
vation services, and (2) “the relevant purchasing public consists of con-
sumers who use hotel reservations services offered via the internet or in
person,” only the third factor was at issue.132
The Fourth Circuit found no error in the district court’s ruling that
BOOKING.COM was not generic.133 The court noted that “using the
characters ‘booking.com’ or ‘bookings.com’ in a longer domain name,”
such as “hotelbooking.com” or “ebooking.com,” did not necessarily indi-
cate that BOOKING.COM was generic, contrary to the USPTO’s argu-
ment.134 Indeed, the court found that consumer surveys such as the one
provided by Booking.com “are the ‘preferred method of proving
genericness.’”135
125. Id.
126. Id. at 178.
127. Booking.com’s Teflon survey showed that “74.8% of consumers recognized
BOOKING.COM as a brand.” Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 179.
130. Id. at 179–80.
131. Id. at 180.
132. Id. at 180–81.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 182.
135. Id. at 183.
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Next, the court declined to adopt the USPTO’s proposed rule “that
adding the top-level domain (TLD) .com to a generic second-level do-
main (SLD) like booking can never yield a non-generic mark.”136 The
court also disagreed with the USPTO’s proposition that BOOK-
ING.COM is necessarily generic because its component parts, “booking”
and “.com,” are themselves generic.137 The ultimate question, the court
held, was “what the public primarily perceives the term as a whole to
refer to.”138 The court clarified, however, that “[m]erely appending .com
to an SLD does not render the resulting domain name non-generic.”139
Ultimately, the court held that “when ‘.com’ is combined with an SLD,
even a generic SLD, the resulting composite may be non-generic where
evidence demonstrates that the mark’s primary significance to the public
as whole is the source, not the product.”140 Thus, the court found BOOK-
ING.COM to be a protectable trademark and affirmed the district court’s
partial grant of summary judgment.
With regard to attorney’s fees, the Fourth Circuit relied on its own pre-
cedent to side with the government.141 Under 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3), a
trademark applicant can appeal a decision of the USPTO to the Federal
Circuit or to the district court. If the applicant appeals to the district
court, the applicant is required to pay for all expenses of the case, win or
lose.142 Under Fourth Circuit precedent, the American Rule—the princi-
pal that each party pays its own attorney’s fees unless Congress explicitly
states otherwise—only applies where attorney’s fees are awarded to a
prevailing party. Thus, the court found that the American Rule did not
apply to the relevant section of the Trademark Act, which awarded ex-
penses to the USPTO regardless of outcome, and affirmed the grant of
the USPTO’s attorneys’ fees.143
The U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari, and the case has been
placed on the 2020 docket.144
D. CANNABIS CONNECTION – WOODSTOCK VENTURES LC V.
WOODSTOCK ROOTS, LLC
In this case, the producers of the 1969 Woodstock musical festival sued
the defendants for trademark infringement for selling marijuana products
under the WOODSTOCK trademark.145 In response, the defendants
counterclaimed, seeking a preliminary injunction to enjoin the plaintiffs
136. Id. at 181.
137. Id. at 184.
138. Id. (emphasis in original).
139. Id. at 185.
140. Id. at 186.
141. Id. at 188.
142. Id. at 187.
143. Id. at 188.
144. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V., No. 19–46, 2019 WL
5850636 (U.S. Nov. 8, 2019).
145. Woodstock Ventures LC v. Woodstock Roots, LLC, 387 F. Supp. 3d 306, 310
(S.D.N.Y. 2019).
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from selling “cannabis and cannabis-related products” under the WOOD-
STOCK name.146
The plaintiffs own multiple trademark registrations for the WOOD-
STOCK mark that cover entertainment services and related merchandise,
while the defendants own two trademark registrations for the WOOD-
STOCK mark in connection with various smokers’ articles, including
“cigarette rolling papers” and “tobacco free electronic cigarettes for med-
ical purposes comprised of e-liquids derived from the mature stalks of
industrial hemp exclusive of any resins.”147 In 2016, the plaintiffs began
using the WOODSTOCK mark in connection with recreational mari-
juana. In 2008, the parties had entered into a coexistence agreement in
which both parties “‘have rights in the WOODSTOCK mark;
[d]efendants for broadcasting and promotional goods and services, and
Plaintiffs for entertainment and promotional goods and services.’”148
Ultimately, the court found no likelihood of confusion between the
“plaintiffs’ use of the WOODSTOCK mark for recreational marijuana
products . . . and the [d]efendants’ use of the mark in connection with
‘smokers’ articles.”149 In addition to the dissimilarity in the typeface and
styles of the two WOODSTOCK marks, the court found that the parties’
goods are different, as “plaintiffs’ products all involve the use of recrea-
tional marijuana, while [d]efendants have expressly disavowed the notion
that their products are intended for use with recreational marijuana.”150
Indeed, in obtaining the WOODSTOCK trademark registrations for vari-
ous smokers’ articles, the defendants told the USPTO that the products
would not be used in connection with selling marijuana.151 The court fur-
ther concluded that it “cannot give weight to [d]efendants’ alleged intent
to expand into the area of selling recreational marijuana, because the sale
of recreational marijuana is illegal under federal law.”152
As this case illustrates, the disparity in federal and state laws regarding
the legality of marijuana products can lead to seemingly unusual out-
comes in trademark enforcement cases. While thirty-three states have le-
galized marijuana to some degree, the substance remains banned at the
federal level. Consequently, cannabis companies seeking federal protec-
tion for their trademarks to apply for registration in connection with
smoking accessories and similar products, but they may not obtain pro-
tection for anything that contains cannabis. Until marijuana is legalized at
the federal level, cannabis companies will continue to encounter difficul-
ties in enforcing their trademark rights.
146. Id. at 310–11.
147. Id. at 312.
148. Id. at 310.
149. Id. at 311.
150. Id. at 318.
151. Id. at 319.
152. Id. at 318.
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IV. COPYRIGHT UPDATE
A. NOT SO FAST – FOURTH ESTATE PUBLIC BENEFIT CORP. V.
WALL-STREET.COM
This year, the U.S. Supreme Court settled a split among U.S. Courts of
Appeals regarding whether a copyright owner can sue for infringement
before the Copyright Office grants registration.153 The Copyright Act of
1976 gives copyright protection to “original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression,” and rights in such works attach as
soon as the works are created.154 However, 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) provides
that “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United
States work shall be instituted until . . . registration of the copyright claim
has been made in accordance with this title.”155 The parties in Fourth
Estate disputed the meaning of “registration” in Section 411(a).
Plaintiff Fourth Estate, a news organization, sued Wall-Street.com and
its owner for copyright infringement after Wall-Street failed to remove
Fourth Estate’s news articles from its website despite having canceled the
parties’ license agreement.156 Before filing suit, Fourth Estate had filed
copyright applications for the news articles, but the Copyright Office had
not yet granted or refused registration. The district court dismissed the
complaint because the Copyright Office had not yet processed Fourth Es-
tate’s applications at the time the suit was filed, and the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal.
Fourth Estate appealed, arguing that “registration” for the purposes of
Section 411(a) occurs “when a copyright owner submits the application,
materials, and fee” to the Copyright Office.157 Wall-Street, in line with a
previous holding by the Eleventh Circuit, argued that Section 411(a)’s
registration requirement is “satisfied only when the Copyright Office
grants registration.”158
The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with Wall-Street and the
lower courts, holding that “registration” in Section 411(a) “refers to the
Copyright Office’s act of granting registration, not to the copyright claim-
ant’s request for registration.”159 In other words, “registration occurs, and
a copyright claimant may commence an infringement suit, when the Cop-
yright Office registers a copyright.”160 The statute provides several excep-
tions to this rule, including for movies or musical compositions, where an
owner can apply for preregistration, a limited review of the application
after which the copyright owner may commence an infringement suit.161
153. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 886–87
(2019).
154. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2020).
155. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2020).
156. Fourth Estate, 139 S. Ct. at 887.
157. Id. at 888.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 890.
160. Id. at 886.
161. Id. (first citing 17 U.S.C. § 408(f)(2); then citing 37 C.F.R. § 202.16(b)(1) (2018)).
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The statute provides a similar exception for live broadcasts.162 In addi-
tion, copyright owners may institute an infringement suit after the Copy-
right Office refuses registration.163 The Court explained these exceptions
would be “superfluous” if a copyright application alone satisfied the re-
quirements of Section 411(a).164
B. A DAMPER ON DAMAGES – RIMINI STREET, INC. V.
ORACLE USA, INC.
In the context of damage awards in copyright cases, the U.S. Supreme
Court considered the ability of a district court to award “full costs,” ulti-
mately finding that an award of “full costs” must comply with definition
of costs provided in the general costs statute of the Judicial Code.165
After finding that Rimini Street had infringed multiple Oracle copy-
rights, a jury awarded Oracle $12.8 million in damages, which included
compensation for expert witnesses, e-discovery, and jury consulting. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the award, though
recognized that the award covered expenses that are not provided for in
28 U.S.C. §§ 1821 and 1920, the federal statute that allows district courts
to award costs. Under these sections of the statute, Congress delineated
six categories of litigation expenses that may be awarded as “costs.”166
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that a court may not award costs
for litigation expenses that fall outside of the statutory categories because
the Copyright Act does not explicitly authorize an award of any expenses
that fall outside of the statutory parameters.167
V. TRADE SECRET UPDATE
A. GIVE US THE GOODS – FOOD MARKETING INSTITUTE V.
ARGUS LEADER MEDIA
Under the National Parks test followed by courts of appeal, if a party
sought commercial information from a federal agency under the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA), the federal agency was required to provide
the information unless disclosing the information would result in substan-
tial competitive harm.168 Argus Leader Media submitted a FOIA request
to obtain information about the retailers affiliated with the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) from the U.S. Department of Ag-
riculture (USDA). The USDA refused to provide some of the requested
information, and Argus Leader Media sued in federal district court. The
district court sided with Argus Leader Media, and the U.S. Court of Ap-
162. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 411(c) (2020)).
163. Id. at 889 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)).
164. Id.
165. Rimini St., Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 873, 875–76 (2019).
166. Id. at 876.
167. Id. at 878.
168. See Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2364 (2019) (citing
Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
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peals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, explaining that a “competitive
harm” is required to withhold information under exemption four of
FOIA, which was not shown in this case.169
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that that the con-
fidentiality exemption of the FOIA does not require a showing of sub-
stantial competitive harm.170
B. MONITORING IS OKAY – SCHERER DESIGN GROUP V.
AHEAD ENGINEERING
In Scherer Design Group LLC v. Ahead Engineering LLC,171 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit clarified what does and does not
constitute “unclean hands” for the purpose of trade secret misappropria-
tion claims. Scherer sought an injunction in federal district court to block
former employees from using its commercial information in competing
companies started by one of the employees. Scherer became aware of the
potential trade secret appropriation by monitoring Facebook activity
from the former employees. Scherer had recovered a password to an em-
ployee’s Facebook profile from the computer cache after they left. The
district court granted the injunction, and declined to accept the em-
ployee’s defense that Scherer’s Facebook monitoring constituted unclean
hands that would bar Scherer’s injunction.172
The Third Circuit agreed, clarifying that unclean hands applies only
when the party seeking the injunction has “committed an unconscionable
act” related to the events giving rise to the injunction request.173 The
Third Circuit held that Scherer’s spying was unrelated to the employee’s
breach of loyalty, and therefore did not invoke the unclean hands
doctrine.174
C. TEXAS ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE AMENDMENTS
The last year has seen two significant legal changes relating to trade
secret causes of action and the Texas anti-SLAPP statute, the Texas Citi-
zens Participation Act (TCPA). First, in August, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit resolved a lingering question about the
applicability of the TCPA in a federal court sitting in diversity. Second,
the Texas legislature amended the TCPA to render it inapplicable to the
most common types of trade secret cases.
As a state law, many courts have held that the TCPA is inapplicable to
federal claims in federal court.175 But federal courts struggled with
169. Id. at 2361–62.
170. Id. at 2361.
171. 764 F. App’x 147 (3d Cir. 2019).
172. Id. at 149.
173. Id. at 150.
174. Id. at 152.
175. E.g., Sw. Airlines Co. v. Roundpipe, LLC, 375 F. Supp. 3d 687, 697 n.3 (N.D. Tex.
2019) (“[B]ecause the court exercises federal question jurisdiction over all of Southwest’s
federal claims, state laws such as the TCPA would not apply.”) (citing N.P.U., Inc. v. Wil-
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whether the TCPA applied to state claims when the federal court was
exercising diversity or supplemental jurisdiction.176 On August 23, 2019,
the Fifth Circuit confronted the issue directly in Klocke v. Watson.177
There, the court held that provisions of the TCPA conflict with certain
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, therefore, the TCPA was not appli-
cable in federal court when the court is sitting in diversity jurisdiction.178
Accordingly, it now seems unlikely that the TCPA will be utilized in fed-
eral court litigation.
On September 1, 2019, Texas House Bill 2730 went into effect. That bill
amended the TCPA and redefined the “legal actions” to which the TCPA
was applicable to generally exclude trade secret cases. In particular, the
amended TCPA does not apply to legal actions seeking recovery for mis-
appropriation of trade secrets that arise “from an officer-director, em-
ployee-employer, or independent contractor relationship.”179 The revised
TCPA applies to all actions filed on or after its effective date of Septem-
ber 1, 2019.180 Thus, litigants in trade secret misappropriation cases filed
in Texas Courts on or after September 1, 2019, will not likely enjoy the
provisions of the TCPA in their cases, as the amendments generally ex-
clude typical and well-plead trade secret misappropriation cases. Of
course, novel cases, cases involving unique facts, and poorly plead cases
that mention trade secret misappropriation (i.e., those that do not arise
from one of the three enumerated relationships) may still be subject to
dismissal under the TCPA.
son Audio Specialties, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 3d 661, 664 (W.D. Tex. 2018)); N.P.U., 343 F.
Supp. 3d at 664 (“The TCPA therefore provides no basis for dismissing Wilson Audio’s
counterclaims arising under federal law.”); Thoroughbred Ventures, LLC v. Disman, No.
4:18-CV-00318, 2018 WL 3472717, at *3 (E.D. Tex. July 19, 2018) (“[T]he Court finds that
the TCPA, regardless if classified as procedural or substantive, does not apply in federal
court.”); Misko v. Backes, No. 3:16-CV-3080-M (BT), 2018 WL 2335466, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
May 4, 2018) (“[T]he TCPA does not apply to Misko’s lawsuit, which was filed in federal
court pursuant to federal question jurisdiction, based on a single claim for violation of the
federal Lanham Act.”).
176. Compare, e.g., Khalil v. Mem’l Hermann Health Sys., No. H-17-1914, 2017 WL
5068157, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2017) (applying the TCPA in a diversity action), and
Banik v. Tamez, No. 7:16-CV-462, 2017 WL 1228498, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2017) (same),
and Allen v. Heath, No. 6:16-CV-51MHS-JDL, 2016 WL 7971294, at *3 (E.D. Tex. May 6,
2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 6:16-CV-51, 2016 WL 3033561 (E.D. Tex.
May 27, 2016) (same), and Williams v. Cordillera Commc’ns, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-124, 2014
WL 2611746, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 11, 2014) (same), with Sw. Airlines, 375 F. Supp. 3d at
699–700 (concluding that the TCPA is procedural and conflicts with certain Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure); and N.P.V., 343 F. Supp. 3d at 665–66 (same), and Thoroughbred
Ventures, No. 4:18-CV-00318, 2018 WL 3472717, at *2–3 (same), and Mathiew v. Subsea 7
(US), LLC, No. 4:17-CV-3140, 2018 WL 1515264, at *5–7 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2018), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 4:17-CV-3140, 2018 WL 1513673 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26,
2018) (same), and Rudkin v. Roger Beasley Imps., Inc., No. A-17-CV-849-LY, 2017 WL
6622561, at *2–3 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. A-
17-CV-849-LY, 2018 WL 2122896 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2018) (same).
177. 936 F.3d 240, 244 (5th Cir. 2019).
178. Id. at 245–49.
179. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.010(a)(5)(A).
180. Act of May 17, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 378, (H.B. 2730), §§ 11–12.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Courts during the Survey period continued to provide new clarity in
the patent, trademark, and broader IP landscape. In patents, the U.S. Su-
preme Court dealt a blow to the federal government, prohibiting federal
agencies from petitioning the PTAB for post-grant review of patents.181
The Supreme Court also weighed in on the trademark side, striking down
the Lanham Act’s ban on “immoral” and “scandalous” marks (likely
making way for a colorful batch of trademark applications in the fu-
ture).182 The lower federal courts also removed ambiguity in important
areas, including the Federal Circuit’s decision regarding state sovereign
immunity and IPR challenges,183 and the Supreme Court’s decision re-
garding the protectability of trademarks containing the term “.com.”184
In summary, some decisions during the survey period delivered answers
to long-standing questions in IP law, while others will continue to develop
into cases to watch in 2020.
181. Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1858–59 (2019).
182. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019).
183. Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp. 926 F.3d 1327, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
184. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019).
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